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NATURAL LAW THEORY AND
THE DECLARATION ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF
THE SECOND VATICAN
COUNCIL
CHARLES P. KINDREGAN*
Introduction
T HERE ARE FEW AREAS of human activity which have been the cause
of as much hatred, war and civil discrimination as religious belief
and practice. The record of history indicates that man experiences a
great insecurity which gives rise to feelings of aggressive hostility when
he confronts a religious belief alien to his own. Freedom to practice
religion according to one's own conscience has been advocated by many
philosophers, theologians and persecuted religious minorities, but civ-
ilized man has consistently practiced gross religious intolerance. This
has been true even in the so-called "golden ages" of western civilization.
The reaction of the Athenians to Socrates' comments about the gods,
the crude attempts of great Roman emperors such as Marcus Aurelius,
Decius and Diocletian to destroy Christianity, the slaughter of Christians
by Jewish fanatics at Caesarea in 556, the massacres of Jews by Chris-
tians in the Armleder of 1336-38, the burning of English Protestants
under Queen Mary, the drawing and quartering of Papists in Elizabe-
than England, the proscription of non-Catholic missionary activity in
Colombia, and the forced destruction of Mormon polygamy in the
United States are but a few indicators of this tendency in the story of
* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University. B.A., M.A., LaSalle College;
J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law; LL.M., Northwestern University.
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western man. Rare in history has been the
example of a man like the Pharisee Gamaliel,
who, when the Sanhedrin was about to
order the execution of the Christian Apos-
tles, could counsel the leaders of Israel:
keep away from these men and let them
alone. For if this plan or work is of men it
will be overthrown, but if it is of God you
will not be able to overthrow it.'
In recent centuries there has been a more
general verbal acceptance of the idea that
religious freedom should be protected by
the state, at least in the western world. At
present the laws of most western nations
provide constitutional protections against
coercions or restrictions of religious belief
and practice.2 Whatever the reasons for this
development, it raises the hope that western
man will someday overcome religious in-
tolerance. Dr. Sterling Brown, President of
the National Conference of Christians and
Jews, has said that "at first it may only be
a principle, but in due time it will also be
true [that religious freedom will prevail]
1 Acts of the Apostles 5:38-39.
2 Of course constitutional protections on paper
can be meaningless in reality. For example, the
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. forbids any "direct
or indirect restriction of rights" because of social,
national, cultural or racial associations. FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDER-
ATED SOVIET REPUBLIC art. 123, ch. X (U.S.S.R.
1918) (Constitution of the Communist Party
States, Hoover Institution, Stan. Univ. 1969). Yet
a flow of recent books and articles indicates that
these constitutional "protections" have little value
for Soviet Jews. See, e.g., E. FLANNERY, THE
ANGUISH OF THE JEWS 231 (1965); J. TELLER,
THE KREMLIN, THE JEWS AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(1957); Decter, The Status of Jews in the Soviet
Union, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 422 (1963).
in practice if the present trends continue."3
Among the trends noted by Dr. Brown was
the advocacy of religious freedom by the
Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church
meeting in the twenty-first Ecumenical
Council. The Declaration on Religious
Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) (the Dec-
laration), promulgated by Pope Paul VI on
December 7, 1965, is significant because it
places the world's largest religious denom-
ination on the side of the proposition that
the state must guarantee freedom of reli-
gious belief and practice for all of its sub-
jects regardless of what they believe. "It is
necessary," the Bishops wrote, "that reli-
gious freedom be everywhere provided with
with an effective constitutional guarantee"
(article 15). The only limitation placed
on this is the right of the state to "defend
itself against possible abuses," to "provide
effective safeguard of the rights of all cit-
izens and for the peaceful settlement of
conflicts of rights"-but the state can act in
these areas only in a non-partisan, non-
arbitrary and judicial manner (article 7).
That such thoughts would come from
the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council
is particularly significant in that Roman
Catholicism as an institution has a long
history of promoting intolerance of other
religious groups. When Christianity first
gained official toleration in the Roman
Empire (Edict of Milan, 313), and then
secured a preferred status under Theodosius,
signs of intolerance towards others were
already present. Gradually Jews came
under various proscriptions. Heretics such
3 Times-Review, Dec. 23, 1966, at 7 (newspaper
of the Catholic diocese of La Crosse, Wisconsin).
as Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites and
Manichaeans frequently found themselves
under civil as well as ecclesiastical dis-
abilities. Many early Christian writers in-
sisted that a person cannot be compelled
to accept the Christian faith, 4 but the right
to believe something other than official
doctrine was often limited. The Code of
Justinian placed unbelievers under further
disabilities, for example, it "stripped Juda-
ism of its explicit legality."'5
In the medieval period, Catharist com-
munities were destroyed with ecclesiastical
approval. Christian Europe engaged in a
series of bloody "crusades" to drive the
infidel from the holy land. Heretic-hunting
bishops allowed Jan Hus and Jeanne d'Arc
to be burned at the stake. The Inquisition
used physical torture to discover "false"
Christians among converted Jews. This was
part of the price which western civilization
paid to maintain its Catholic unity free from
alien influences.
The Reformation witnessed the growth of
fanatic intolerance within the Christian
church. Catholic-Protestant disputes became
so disruptive of the political, social and
economic life of Europe that compromises
aimed at reducing friction in society soon
came about. These compromises usually
involved the simple imposition of a single
form of Christianity on a given people;
religious freedom did not exist except for
4 E.g., Ambrose of Milan, Letter 21, PL 16,
1005; Augustine of Hippo, Letter 23, PL 33, 98;
Letter 34, PL 33, 132.
5 E. FLANNERY, supra note 2, at 66-67, citing
Code of Justinian 1-3-54; 1-10-2; 1-5-13, Novella
131; 1-5-12; 1-5-21.
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the prince who chose the religion which his
subjects were to follow.
Set against even these few examples, the
importance of the Declaration can be easily
seen. What is perhaps not so easily seen
is the importance of the underlying the-
oretical basis for religious freedom given by
the Declaration. The constant reappearance
of religious intolerance in Christian history
makes it imperative that the legal basis for
religious freedom flow from firm roots.
Should it be based merely in the needs of
the day, should it merely be a device to
condemn the anti-religious activities of the
Communist states, then the Declaration's
statement of the right to religious freedom
would have little historical impact. If the
roots are so firm that the Church has made
a doctrinal commitment to religious free-
dom, then Catholic states will find it dif-
ficult to deny religious freedom without
placing themselves outside the Church. This
paper is an attempt to survey various the-
ories about the legal basis for religious free-
dom and compare them to the approach
used in the Declaration.
Legislative History of the
Declaration
When the Bishops met in Rome to orga-
nize the Second Vatican Council, the pro-
posed agenda did not include the drafting
of a separate statement on religious free-
dom. Discussion of the subject among
Catholics had largely centered on Catholic-
Protestant dialogue over the status of Ref-
ormation churches in Latin America and
over church-state relationships in countries
such as the United States. It was therefore
to be expected that any consideration of
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religious freedom would be made in con-
nection with the ecumenical movement. The
first two texts of what eventually became
the Declaration on Religious Freedom were
chapters in preliminary drafts of the Decree
on Ecumenism. Within an ecumenical
framework, an analysis of religious freedom
became extremely difficult because the
Council was badly divided over the rights
of individual conscience in relation to ob-
jective truth. The basis for religious free-
dom at this point was charity rather than
natural law-natural right.' John Courtney
Murray noted that the decision to create a
separate document on religious freedom
released the discussion from "its previous
formal preoccupation with ecumenical re-
lationships."' 7 In the third draft, the study
was placed in a natural law framework; this
provided the basic structuring of the doc-
ument through three subsequent re-draft-
ings.
The final draft takes the position that
"the right to religious freedom has its
foundation in the very dignity of the human
person" (article 2). Anyone acquainted
with Catholic theological vocabulary would
immediately recognize these words as point-
ing toward a natural law basis for the
; Murray, The Declaration on Religious Free-
dora: A Moment in Its Legislative History, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END AND A BEGINNING
15, 22-23 (J. Murray ed. 1966).
7 Id. at 27. This is not to say that the document
does not retain great ecumenical value (see
Littell, A Response, in THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN 1I 697 (W. Abbott ed. 1966)) or in-
fluence on church problems of authority and
conscience. See Murray, Freedom, Authority, and
Community, 115 AMERICA 734 (1966).
right.8 There has been a noticeable move
away from traditional natural law thinking
among Catholics in recent years," but the
Declaration (as well as parts of the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World and the Declaration on Christian
Education) shows that the theory of natural
right is likely to continue playing an im-
portant role in contemporary Catholic
thought.
The Enlightenment Theory of a
Natural Right to Religious
Freedom and the
Declaration
Enlightenment philosophy forms an im-
portant historical backdrop to the theory of
religious freedom contained in the Declara-
tion. Of course, explicitly Christian the-
ological developments also were influential
as will be shown subsequently. But as Dr.
Jerald C. Brauer, the Dean of the Divinity
8 Papal natural law teachings on various subjects
are illustrative of this point. See, e.g., Encyclical
Letter of John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, April 11,
1963, AAS 55 at 257 (1963); Encyclical Letter
of John XXIIT, Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961,
AAS 53 at 401 (1961); Encyclical Letter of Pius
XI, Quadragesitno Anno, May 15, 1931, AAS
23 at 190 (1931); Encyclical Letter of Pius XI,
Casti Connubii, Dec. 31, 1930, AAS 22 at 546
(1930).
9 See, e.g., A. DONDEYNE, CONTEMPORARY EURO-
PEAN THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (1958);
L. DUPRES, KIERKEGAARD AS THEOLOGIAN: THE
DIALECTIC OF CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE (1963);
McKenzie, Natural Law in the New Testament,
9 BIBLICAL RES. 1-13 (1964); Walgrave, Is
Morality Static or Dynamic?, Arntz, Natural Law
And Its History, in V CONCILIUM THEOLOGY IN
THE AGE OF RENEWAL, MORAL PROBLEMS AND
CHRISTIAN PERSONALISM 22, 39 (F. Bockle ed.
1965); Wassmer, Is Intrinsic Evil A Viable
Term?, 5 CHL STUDIES 307 (1966).
School at the University of Chicago, has
observed:
religious freedom emerged.., not so much
from the principles and activities of the
traditional Christian churches, but primarily
from the philosophy of the Enlightenment
and from the necessities of historical cir-
cumstances. 10
John Courtney Murray, the American
Jesuit who had been widely proclaimed as
the principal author of the Declaration,
indicated the debt which the document owes
to Enlightenment philosophy of natural
right as this is embodied in the first amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United
States:"
Religious freedom is a freedom from coer-
cion; it is an immunity; its content is neg-
ative. Historically, the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States
launched this conception. The freedoms of
the First Amendment, including the "free
exercise of religion," were understood to be
certain specified immunities; moreover, they
were essentially related to the concept of
constitutional government, which is two-
fold in its import. First, the powers of
government are limited by a higher order of
human rights; and second it is "to secure
these rights [that] governments are insti-
tuted among men (Declaration of Indepen-
dence)." The political or civil freedoms of
the First Amendment . . . were not claims
on society and government for positive ac-
tion, but assurances against positive coer-
10 Brauer, Religious Freedom as a Human Right,
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END AND A BEGINNING
45, 48 (J. Murray ed. 1966).
11 Father Murray had been the leading proponent
of the American approach to church-state rela-
tions among Catholic theologians. See J. MURRAY,
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960).
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cive action .... hence the object of religious
freedom as a juridical conception is not the
actualization of the positive values inherent
in religious belief, profession, and prac-
tice. . . . The object of the right is simply
the assured absence of constraints and re-
straints on individuals and groups in their
efforts to pursue freely the positive values
of religion. 12
The ideas described by Murray, and
adopted in the Declaration, grew out of the
Enlightenment. From the classical jus
naturale the Enlightenment philosophers
evolved a theory of natural right. This
evolution is noticeable in the writings of
Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Montesquieu
and Wolfe. However, it was John Locke
who most influenced this development.
Locke did not cut himself off completely
from medieval theories of natural law, 13
but he pictured the content of natural law
as a catalogue of rights inherent in all
human beings.' 4 Both Locke and Rousseau
believed that natural rights become civil
rights in social man. The right to religious
freedom was an example of a natural right,
and its constant citation by the Enlighten-
ment philosophers indicates its importance
in their thinking.
Locke and the other natural rights advo-
cates of the Enlightenment met consider-
able opposition, notably from Thomas
12 Murray, supra note 6, at 27-28.
13 His thinking shows the influence of Joseph
Hooker, who had developed an Anglican-
Thomistic natural law doctrine. Scott-Craig, John
Locke and Natural Rights, II SOUTHERN METH-
ODIST UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 29
(1955).
14 J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOS-
OPHY (1950); W. VON LEYDEN, ESSAYS ON THE
LAW OF NATURE (1954).
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Hobbes and David Hume, but unquestion-
ably prevailed in the minds of the American
founding fathers. Adams, Paine, Henry,
Priestly, Yates, Hamilton and Wilson all
proclaimed their devotion to the natural
rights of man.15 Thomas Jefferson made
the classic statement of the Enlightenment
theory of natural right in the Declaration
of American Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men ... are endowed by their Cre-
ator with certain[16i unalienable rights, that
among these are life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness. That to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among
men .... 17
That Jefferson thought of freedom from
coercion in religious practice as one of these
unalienable rights, a dimension of "liberty,"
is without doubt.18
The Enlightenment doctrine of the
natural right to religious freedom could be
summarized in three points:
1. The right to believe and practice reli-
gion, or not to believe, is inherent in
man as a thinking, willing being.
15 Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of the
Founding Fathers, 1 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 3
(1947). Wright, American Interpretations of Nat-
ural Law, 20 AM. POL. Scr. REV. 524 (1926).
16 Jefferson's phrase was "inherent and unalien-
able rights." Congress substituted the word "cer-
tain" for "inherent." THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
DEMOCRACY 13 (S. Padover ed. 1954).
17 Declaration of Independence.
18 See An Act for Establishing Religious Free-
dom. This act, written by Jefferson, became law
in Virginia in 1785. The text is found in 2 BOYD,
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (1950).
For further discussion, see T. JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (W. Peden ed. 1955).
2. The right to practice religion freely for-
bids the state to coerce the individ-
ual. 19
3. The natural right to religious freedom
becomes a civil (constitutional) right
and requires the state to protect the
citizen against religious coercion. The
state, however, has no affirmative duty
toward religion.
Does the Declaration see the right in the
same light as many commentators have
maintained? The Declaration proclaims that
"the right to religious freedom has its foun-
dation, not in the subjective disposition of
the person, but in his very nature" (article
2), that this right requires "immunity from
external coercion as well as psychological
freedom" (article 2), and that "this right
of the human person to religious freedom
is to be recognized in the constitutional
law whereby society is governed. Thus it
is to become a civil right" (article 2).
These ideas certainly sound of the En-
lightenment.
However, there are some commentators
who detect basic departures from this
pattern. Professor Denenfeld of Western
Michigan University has written that the
Declaration "differ[s] sufficiently in its
fundamental means and purposes to be out
19 There is a similarity between Enlightenment
thought and the "negative natural law" of Lao-
Tze, the teacher of Confucius. His tao, the way
of nature, is for each man to work out his
destiny free of any interference from the state.
Hu Shih, The Natural Law in the Chinese Tradi-
tion, 5 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 119, 125-29 (1951).
American lawyers are familiar with such ideas
since this philosophy dominated Supreme Court
thinking in contract law during the nineteenth
century.
of harmony with the genius of the Consti-
tution. '20 Certainly it is true that there are
ideas in the Declaration with which the
Enlightenment philosophers would have
taken issue. The Declaration recognizes the
idea of an established religion "in view of
peculiar circumstances obtaining among
certain peoples" (article 6), as long as
freedom of practice is maintained equally
for all. The statement that "government
I ..ought to take account of the religious
life of the people and show it favor" (article
3) would seem to be quite foreign to first
amendment thinking. In spite of these state-
ments, however, the overall impression
created by the Declaration is of a strictly
impartial state whose function is to prevent
coercion of religious belief and practice.
John Cogley, the Religion Editor for the
New York Times, has observed that "in
the Declaration . . . there are bumpy
stretches; the screeching of conservative
brakes is heard almost every time the text
turns a new theological corner."' Un-
questionably, the compromises required to
achieve agreement among several thousand
men from every nation on earth resulted
in some imbalances in the text. But this
reader's analysis of the text convinces him
that the thinking of the Declaration is at
least a first cousin to the Enlightenment
philosophy embodied in the first amend-
ment.
20 Denenfeld, The Counciliar Declaration and
the American Declaration, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
AN END AND A BEGINNING 120 (J. Murray ed.
1966).
21 Cogley, After the Council, THE CRITIC, April-
May 1966, at 51, 52.
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Scholastic Natural Law, Thomism,
and the Declaration
Christians have frequently used the
phrase: "the natural law is written on the
heart of man."'2 2 The phrase is based on
Saint Paul's statement to the Romans: "the
gentiles who have no law do by nature what
the law prescribes . . . they show the work
of the law written on their hearts. 2 3 Pro-
fessor Julius Stone of the University of
Sidney thought that Paul "left the overall
impression that God's dictates are not to
be understood in terms of human under-
standing, and are not rational in terms of
human reason. ' '24 Indeed, the most influ-
ential of the early Christian writers,
Augustine of Hippo, did not think of natural
law as having a purely rational basis. He
saw natural law as a transcription of the will
and knowledge of God into the spiritual
faculties of man,25 a transcription intended
to aid man in following the eternal law
which is in God.20
In the Middle Ages, Christian philos-
ophers began to move toward a more
specifically rational approach to natural law.
Influenced by the writings of Aristotle, the
22 Encyclical Letter of Pius XI, Divine Redemp-
torts, March 19, 1937, AAS 29 at 65, 76 (1937).
See also Address by Pius XI, Dec. 24, 1941,
AAS 34, at 16 (1942). The great disciple of
Luther, Philip Melanchthon, used the phrase. See
P. MELANCHTHON, THE Loci COMMUNES 110
(C. Hill trans. 1944).
23 Letter to the Romans 2: 14-15.
24 J. STONE, HUMAN JUSTICE 43-44 (1965),
citing I Cor. 1:19-28, 2:14, 3:19; 1 Tim. 6:16.
25 Augustine of Hippo, Of Disputed Questions
53, 2.
26 Augustine of Hippo, Against Faustuin 22, 27.
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Mohammedan philosophers Avicenna and
Averroes, '2 7  and Jewish thinkers such
as Abraham Ibn Daud and Moses
Maimonides, 28 the scholastics built a whole
system of natural law morality. The dom-
inant feature of this philosophy was the
emphasis given to the role of "right reason"
in determining the natural rights and duties
of man. Natural law is that part of God's
design for the universe which can be known
to man by his own reason without the aid
of Judaeo-Christian revelation. This bore a
resemblance to Cicero's "right reason which
applies to all men a true law, unchangeable
and eternal, which accords with human
nature. '29 But whereas the Roman stoics
found a statement of this law in the jus
gentium, the scholastics deduced the content
of natural law from the goods which they
believed human life should achieve. Some
commentators have described the basic
principle of scholastic natural law, "bonum
est faciendum, malum vitandum," as a
"tautology, '30 but the medieval scholastics
were quite precise in stating what goods
27 See 11 F. COPELSTON, THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 190-99 (1950).
28 See I. HUSIK, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL JEWISH
PHILOSOPHY (1916); Freehof, The Natural Law
in the Jewish Tradition, 5 NAT. L. INST. PROC.
15 (1951).
29 M. CICERO, DE REPUBLICA 111 22 (circa 51
B.C.).
20 See Nielson, The Myth of Natural Law, in
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 122, 124
(S. Hook ed. 1964). Some modern Thomists are
so reluctant to specify concrete goods that they
deserve the criticism. See, e.g., Ryan, The Tradi-
tional Concept of Natural Law: An Interpreta-
tion, in LIGHT ON THE NATURAL LAW 13 (1.
Evans ed. 1965).
man should achieve and what evils he
should avoid.:1
The greatest of the scholastics, St.
Thomas Aquinas, suggested that
there is in man an inclination to good . . .
which is special to him: thus man has a
natural inclination to know the truth about
God, to live in society, and so whatever
pertains to this inclination pertains to nat-
ural law, e.g., to shun ignorance, to avoid
offending those among whom one has to
live. 2
It is the inclination to know the truth about
God, and to do so in a social world, which
is the basis for religious freedom in the
thinking of contemporary Thomists. Jacques
Maritain has written:
With respect to the state, to the temporal
community, and to the temporal power he
[man] is free to choose his religious path
at his own risk, his freedom of conscience
is a natural, inviolable right.33
Aquinas himself, however, never alluded
to religious freedom as that right is pro-
posed in the Declaration. He felt that the
rights of Jews to exercise their religion must
be protected by the Christian state because
of the truth found in Judaism. 34 But the
31 Cf. T. FARRELL, THE NATURAL LAW ACCORD-
ING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND SUAREZ (1930);
E. GILSON, MORAL VALUES AND MORAL LIFE,
THE SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1931);
Stevens, The Relationship of Law and Obligation
29 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS'N 195 (1955).
32 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-It, q. 94,
art. 2.
33. J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46 (1958).
34 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 10,
art. 11.
rites of other non-Christians were to be
tolerated in a Christian state only if the
good of avoiding "scandal or disturbance"
was more important than stamping out
activities which are "neither truthful nor
profitable. '35 However, Thomas opposed
the forced baptism of either Jews or pa-
gans. 30  He rejected any toleration of
Christian heretical activity. If heretics did
not renounce their "forgery" of Christianity
they were to be excommunicated by the
church and "deliver[ed] . . . to the secular
tribunal to be exterminated from the world
by death. '37 He also believed that a prince
forfeited his right to rule when he renounced
the Christian faith.3 8
The Declaration ignores the various dis-
tinctions made by Aquinas. The content
of religious belief is made totally irrelevant
to the right to practice what the individ-
ual's belief requires:
nor is anyone to be restrained from acting
in accordance with his own beliefs, whether
privately or publicly, whether alone or in
association with others, within due limits
(article 1).
Religious freedom is said to consist in
those internal, voluntary and free acts
whereby man sets the course of his life
35 Id.
36 Id. at art. 12.
37 Id. q. 11, art. 3. It has been pointed out that
Aquinas' views on heretics flowed from the com-
mon medieval belief that a Christian who know-
ingly rejects his faith must have a mens rea.
Rommen, A Defense of Natural Law, in LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 105, 119 (S.
Hook ed. 1964).
38 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Il-II, q. 12,
art. 2.
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directly toward God. No merely human
power can either command or prohibit acts
of this kind (article 4).
and requires that the state permit com-
munity activities or group rites to all beliefs
(article 5). The only instance in which the
state has a right to limit religious practices
is to prevent abuses relating to public
order-but certainly the religious content
of the belief is irrelevant.
It should be pointed out in fairness to
contemporary Thomists that all the leading
inheritors of the scholastic tradition today
maintain that religious freedom is a natural
right belonging to all regardless of the con-
tent of their belief.3 9 While ignoring
Thomas' own views on toleration of non-
believers and heretics, the Thomists have
constructed a right to religious freedom
based on man's duty to pursue the truth
about God.
The Declaration adopts the scholastic
idea that natural right can be known "by
reason itself" (article 2). It describes the
right as flowing from man's search for
"truth in matters religious" (article 2),
thus following the scholastic principle of
deducing natural rights and duties from
the goods man should be seeking. In
describing the imposition of "profession
39 See, e.g., J. COGLEY, NATURAL LAW AND
MODERN SOCIETY (1961); A. D'ENTREVES, NAT-
URAL LAW (1964); LIGHT ON THE NATURAL LAW
(I. Evans ed. 1965); J. FUCHS, NATURAL LAW
(1965); J. MARITAIN, FREEDOM IN THE MODERN
WORLD (1935); H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW
(1947); J. Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE: A STUDY
IN THE NATURAL LAW (1955); Maritain, Govern-
mental Repression of Heresy, in PROC. CAT.
THEO. Soc. AM. 26 (1949).
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or repudiation of any religion" on people
by the state as a "wrong" (article 6), the
Declaration approaches the Thomistic
notion of an unjust law, i.e., one which
"inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects.1 40 The
theory that a state which hurts its citizens
by depriving them of fundamental rights
has done a wrong, with the result that its
positive law may not be binding, was one
of the scholastics' greatest contributions to
western jurisprudence, and the Declaration
inclines toward this view without expressly
adopting it.
Neo-Kantian Natural Law and
the Declaration
The transcendental method of Immanuel
Kant, based on the categorical-imperative,
states that concepts of choice and freedom
are the a priori basis of law.41 Law is not
drawn from reason, intuition or experience
but from man's right to be free and choose.
For Kant, the idea of deducing natural
right by reason or inducing it from history
or experience was nonsense.
In Catholic circles the most influential
neo-Kantian has been Georgio Del Vecchio,
the former President of the faculty of
Jurisprudence at the University of Rome,
who describes a
transcendental faculty or vocation which
asserts itself psychologically in the con-
sciousness of one's own liberty and respon-
sibility, converts itself immediately into a
supreme norm of the subject, the ethical
40 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 96,
art. 4 (reply to objection 3).
41 1. KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRUNDE DER
RECHTSLEHRE (1797).
imperative. . . . Act not as a means or
vehicle of the forces of nature, but as an
autonomous being, having the quality of a
beginning and an end . . . human actions
are considered no longer in their empirical
nexus, but in their transcendental depen-
dence with regard to the . . . absolute be-
ing of the subject. They are not merely ex-
plained as phenomena of nature, but they
are evaluated as expressions of liberty, that
is, in comparison with that criterion which
is given by the intimate being of the sub-
ject, and constitutes its proper and charac-
teristic law.4
2
Thus, for Del Vecchio, freedom is primary.
It is not merely a means to another good,
but is itself the source of "natural law."
It is apparent from the study made of
the Declaration above that the Bishops did
not value freedom for its own sake as the
neo-Kantians would. Man must be free in
order that he can pursue the truth (article
2) not for the sake of freedom itself. The
Bishops would no doubt agree with Del
Vecchio that every man must have "liberty
of conscience . . . [because] by his very
nature . . . [man] is a subject of right . . .
and the fundamental right of liberty . . .
[is] inalienable. '43  But they would do so
because of the good of truth rather than the
a priori good of freedom of choice.
It is interesting that even Del Vecchio
would grant the right of the state to limit
such rights as freedom of religion "on the
basis of law, that is, with the virtual partic-
ipation of all."' 44 In describing the right of
42 G. DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 439-40
(T. Martin trans. 1953).
43 Id. at 449-52.
44 Id. at 452.
the state to prevent abuses under the pre-
text of religious freedom the Declaration
insists that such restraints not be "arbitrary"
but "controlled by judicial norms" (article
7).
The Declaration and Socio-llistorical
Reality as a Basis of
Religious Freedom
In the several decades before Vatican II
Catholic legal philosophers carried on a
constant debate against those who advo-
cated a "positivist" or "existential" basis for
law. The search for universal values flowing
from the ontological order of things was
thought to be incompatible with the de-
velopment of law on the basis of social
experiment or historical reality. Professor
J. W. Smith has described the former as a
model of "logico-mathematical deduction"
and the latter as "piecemeal inductive
engineering. '4 5 As late as the 1950's there
were few Catholic writers who saw any
hope of a reconciliation of the two views,
although some non-Catholic writers held
such a hope.4
6
In the sixties, new trends in Catholic
natural law thinking began to become ap-
parent.47 The influence of Teilhard de
Chardin started to persuade Catholics that
man himself is the artisan of the world.
45 J. SMITH, THEME FOR REASON 6 (1957).
46 See, e.g., C. CURTIS, LAW As LARGE As LIFE
(1959); Jenkins, The Matchmaker; Toward a
Synthesis of Legal Idealismn and Positivism, 22
J. LEG. EDUC. 1 (1959); Pound, The Revival of
Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME LAW. 287 (1942).
47 E.g., Nogar, The Emergence of the Person in
Natural Law Theory, 5 CHI. STUDIES 81 (1966).
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Theologians such as Ignace Lepp, s Marc
Oraison,4a and Werner Schdllgen,50 opened
natural law morality to experiment, in-
duction and historical considerations, and
philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel made
existentialism respectable among Catholics.
By 1965 it was not unusual to find a Cath-
olic sociologist telling a group of Catholic
theologians that
the idea of natural law . . . does not take
account of the distance between underlying
natural capacities and dispositions and the
historical decisions which intervene between
those capacities and the concrete com-
munity."'
The ferment in Catholic circles over the
problem of birth limitation no doubt aided
48 "We ... do not regret the 'good old days'
when life was lived under the illusion of the
given universality of the moral law, but we
enthusiastically take up the challenge of realizing
ourselves." I. LEPP, THE AUTHENTIC MORALITY
62 (B. Murchland trans. 1965).
49 "The realities governing every life are too
fluid, too dynamic, to be enclosed within the
strict boundaries of a system, for this is precisely
to destroy their existential character." M.
ORAISON, LOVE OR CONSTRAINT? 120 (U. Mor-
rissey ed. 1961).
5o "The question . . . [is] whether, and how, the
essentially dynamic character of reality is com-
patible with permanent, essential attributes;
whether the static way of looking at things,
from the standpoint of natural law, needs to be
supplemented with the introduction of historical
considerations which give to actuality its peculiar
and otherwise unrecognizable value and impor-
tance . . . a satisfactory argument can be made
which permits such a synthesis of timeless prin-
ciples and historically determined norms of
reference. W. SCHOLLGEN, MORAL PROBLEMS To-
DAY 18 (E. Quinn trans. 1963).
."1 Schmitz, The New Freedom and the Integrity
of the Profane, 11 PROC. Soc. CATH. COLLEGE
TEACHERS SACRED DOCTRINE 13, 40 (1965).
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the move toward a more dynamic theory
of natural law.52
The Declaration reflects some of these
developments. It begins with the observa-
tion that there is a growing "demand for
freedom in human society" (article 1).
The wording of article 1 leaves the im-
pression that the Bishops are "search[ing]
into the sacred tradition and doctrine of
the Church" to find a basis for religious
freedom because of the "demand" for reli-
gious freedom which has evolved among
modern men. This is a remarkable admis-
sion by the Church that history, as much
as its own principles, has opened up its
understanding of this dimension of natural
law. Indeed, article 15 is largely devoted
to the socio-historical condition of con-
temporary man as an argument for reli-
gious freedom. The Bishops approve "the
fact . . . that men of the present day want
to be able freely to profess their religion"
(article 15). They denounce the fact
that forms of government still exist under
which, even though freedom of religious
worship receives constitutional recognition,
the powers of government are engaged in
an effort to deter citizens from the profes-
sion of religion.
From these existential facts, and the real-
ization that "men of different cultures and
religions are being brought together in
52 See, e.g., WHAT MODERN CATHOLICS THINK
ABOUT BIRTH CONTROL (W. Birmingham ed.
1964); L. DUPRES, CONTRACEPTION AND CATH-
OLICS (1965); G. GRISEZ, CONTRACEPTION AND
NATURAL LAW (1964); J. NOONAN, CONTRACEP-
TION (1965); T. ROBERTS, CONTRACEPTION AND
HOLINESS (1964).
closer relationships," the Bishops conclude
that "it is necessary that religious freedom
be everywhere provided with an effective
constitutional guarantee" (article 15).
Christological Natural Law
Karl Barth, certainly one of the most
influential voices of modern Protestantism,
has suggested that natural rights exist only
within the framework of Christ's salvic
act.'' Christological natural law has its
roots in the Reformation tradition which
sees nature as essentially corrupted by sin.
If nature has been corrupted then there is
no natural good for man unless Christ re-
stores it to him. Emil Brunner, the best
known contemporary Protestant natural
law advocate, rejects this "Christological
ethics as a collection of phantasms which
at best are of no use,' 5 4 but Barth's state-
ment is probably most representative of
Protestant thought. Catholics have consis-
tently rejected the Christological natural
law; they believe that while sin deprived
man of supernatural grace and wounded
human nature it did not destroy natural
good. Catholic theologians insist that man
possesses natural rights simply because he
is a man-redemption is not the source of
these natural rights.
As could be expected, the Declaration
does not employ Christological natural law
to reach the conclusion of religious free-
dom. Its basis is the "inviolable rights of
the human person" (article 1) rather than
redemption. The teaching of Jesus gives
53 K. BARTH, RECHTFERTIGUNG UND RECHT 1
(1944).
54 E. BRUNNER, DOGMATIK II 374 (1950).
man a greater insight into the dignity of
the human person, but his salvic act is not
the source of natural rights.
Revealed Natural Law
Throughout human history the idea that
a divine revelation is the source of man's
knowledge of his natural rights and duties
has constantly reappeared. For example,
the Moslem theory of natural law is based
on the immanence of God in the universe.
The laws of nature are immutable because
they are the thoughts of God. Muhammad
said "this is the Divine Nature on which
God has built the nature of man." 5   While
natural law can be known in the heart of
man, sin and ignorance prevent him from
knowing the ways of nature. The content
of natural law can therefore be known only
through the religious prophets. The prophet,
as a man of God, alone has the wisdom to
make clear the law of nature.5 6 The great
Prophet, Muhammad, taught that man has
a natural right to freely practice the reli-
gion he believes. Religious freedom was to
prevail in Islam, and it could be limited
only by the need of state to insure order
55 MUHAMMAD, QUARN, Rum 30.
56 Cf. Sundaram, The Natural Law in the Hindu
Tradition, 5 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 69, 72 (1951).
The Hindu tradition is also revelational, for the
content of natural law is "promulgated ...by
teaching. The teachers are those we call seers,
sages, prophets, mystics, philosophers, law-givers,
saints and sons of God." A comparable example
may be the ching as developed in the Canonical
Scripture of Confucianism. The ching is the im-
mutable law of nature, but its content is found
in the sacred canons as these were developed by
Chinese philosopher-theologians. See Hu Shih,
supra note 19, at 133.
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and safety within its borders.5 7 Thus, for
the Moslem, a revelation through the
prophets shows man his natural rights.
The Declaration adopts a form of re-
vealed natural law. 5s Christian revelation
"discloses the dignity of the human person
in its full dimensions" (article 9). Thus
the "doctrine of freedom has roots in divine
revelation" (article 9). Revelation is not
the sole source of this knowledge for "this
dignity [has] come to be more adequately
known to human reason through centuries
of experience," nor does revelation "affirm
in so many words the right to immunity
from external coercion in matters religious"
(article 9).
The primary revelational basis for reli-
gious freedom is the New Testament teach-
ing that faith is a gift of God which
man is at liberty to accept or re-
ject. Being free, faith cannot be based on
any "manner of coercion" (article 10).
Religious freedom makes "no small con-
tribution to the creation of an environment
in which men can without hindrance be
invited to the Christian faith and embrace
it of their own free will" (article 10). The
example of Christ and the Apostles not
using force to spread their views is cited
as giving an additional revelational insight
into religious freedom (article 11). The
Bishops saw the Declaration as being
57 See Hakim, The Natural Law in the Moslem
Tradition, 5 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 29, 33-35
(1951).
58 In Catholic thought, revealed natural law
seems to have had its origin in the writings of
Gratian who thought that natural law was iden-
tifiable with the Decalogue, Decretum 1 pars, d.
I proem.
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faithful to the truth of the gospel . . . and
giving support to the principles of religious
freedom as befitting the dignity of man and
being in accord with divine revelation (ar-
ticle 12).
Conclusion
Six different approaches to natural law
have been discussed above and each has
been compared to the content of the Dec-
laration. Four of these theories are em-
bodied in some form in the document;
only the neo-Kantian and Christological
approaches seem to have had no influence
on the Bishops. The fact that four ap-
proaches did influence the text may give
an impression of random eclecticism, but
there is generally an internal consistency
of thought in the Declaration. The resort
to a first amendment solution to the prob-
lem of the state's function in maintaining
religious freedom and the dependence on
historical-social realities in explaining the
right enable the Church to speak intelligibly
to modern western man. The influence of
contemporary rights-oriented Thomists en-
abled the Bishops to express these ideas in
a vocabulary familiar to Catholics. The
dependence on revelation allowed the
Council to put the right to religious free-
dom on what is for Catholics the most solid
possible juridical grounds. 59 If Aristotle
could justify slavery, if Aquinas could jus-
tify the burning of heretics, and if sixteenth
century Spanish theologians could justify
the denial of civil rights to the Indians of
South America because they "practiced
blasphemy," then it is apparent that a be-
lief in natural law does not of itself assure
a devotion to natural rights as contempo-
rary man understands that concept. How-
ever, since Catholics believe that revelation
constitutes the central event in the history
of man, the Bishops did try to place the
right to religious freedom on the firmest
possible natural law basis which they could
find.
59 See generally B. HARING, THE LIBERTY OF THE
CHILDREN OF GOD (1966); L. JANSSENS, FREE-
DOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(1966); T. LOVE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY:
CONTEMPORARY CHURCH-STATE THEORY (1965);
Crittenden, Religious Liberty: A Study in Doc-
trinal Development, 200 CATH. WORLD 355
(1965); Murray, This Matter of Religious Free-
dom, 112 AMERICA 40 (1965); Murray, The
Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEO. STUDIES
503 (1964).
